Uranium in India

Uranium resources of India

India's uranium resources are modest, with 54,000 tonnes U as reasonably assured resources and 23,500 tonnes as estimated additional resources in situ.

Mining and processing of uranium is carried out by Uranium Corporation of India Ltd, a subsidiary of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), at Jaduguda and Bhatin (since 1967), Narwapahar (since 1995) and Turamdih (since 2002) - all in Jharkhand near Calcutta. A common mill is located near Jaduguda.

In 2005 and 2006 plans were announced to invest almost US$ 700 million to open further mines in Jharkand at Banduburang, Bagjata and Mohuldih; in Meghalaya at Domiasiat-Mawthabah (with a mill) and in Andhra Pradesh at Lambapur-Peddagattu (with mill 50km away at Seripally), both in Nalgonda district, and also a new mill at Turamdih in Jharkhand.

Banduburang is the first open cut mine and is being commissioned in 2007, Bagjata is underground and due in production from 2008, though there had been earlier small operations 1986-91. The Mohuldih underground mine is expected to operate from 2010. The Lambapur-Peddagatta mine has environmental clearance but faces local opposition, and a US$ 220 million Pulivendula mine and mill project in Kadapa district of Andhra Pradesh was approved in February 2007. The Domiasiat-Mawthabah mine project (also called Nongbah-Jynrin) in Meghalaya is also facing longstanding local opposition.

In August 2007 the government approved a new US$ 270 million mine and mill at Tummalapalle in Kadapa district of Andhra Pradesh, for commissioning in 2010.

India's uranium mines and mills - existing and announced

State, district	Mine	Mill	Operating from
Jharkhand	Jaduguda	Jaduguda	1967
	Bhatin	Jaduguda	1967
	Narwapahar	Jaduguda	1995
	Turamdih	Turamdih	2002 (mine)
	Banduburang		2007
	Bagjata		2008
	Mohuldih		2010
Meghalaya	Mawthabah	Mawthabah	?
Andhra Pradesh, Nalgonda	Lambapur-Peddagattu	Seripally	?
Andhra Pradesh, Kadapa	Tummalapalle	Tummalapalle	2010
Andhra Pradesh, Kadapa	Pulivendula	Pulivendula	?

However, India has reserves of 290,000 tonnes of thorium - about one quarter of the world total, and these are intended to fuel its nuclear power program longer-term (see below).

Uranium fuel cycle

DAE's Nuclear Fuel Complex at Hyderabad undertakes refining and a conversion of uranium, which is received as magnesium diuranate (yellowcake) and refined. The main 400 t/yr plant fabricates PHWR fuel (which is unenriched). A small (25 t/yr) fabrication plant makes fuel for the Tarapur BWRs from imported enriched (2.66% U-235) uranium. Depleted uranium oxide fuel pellets (from reprocessed uranium) and thorium oxide pellets are also made for PHWR fuel bundles. Mixed carbide fuel for FBR was first fabricated at BARC in 1979.

Heavy water is supplied by DAE's Heavy Water Board, and the seven plants are working at capacity due to the current building program.

Used fuel from the civil PHWRs is reprocessed by BARC at Trombay, Tarapur and Kalpakkam to extract reactor-grade plutonium for use in the fast breeder reactors. Small plants at each site were supplemented by a new 1000 t/yr Kalpakkam plant commissioned in 1998, and this is being extended to reprocess FBTR carbide fuel. Apart from this all reprocessing uses the Purex process. Further capacity is being built tat Tarapur and Kalpakkam, to come on line by about 2010.

In 2003 a facility was commissioned at Kalpakkam to reprocess mixed carbide fuel using an advanced Purex process. Future FBRs will also have these facilities co-located.

Under plans for the India-specific safeguards to be administered by the IAEA in relation to the civil-military separation plan several fuel fabrication facilities will come under safeguards.

Thorium cycle development

The long-term goal of India's nuclear program is to develop an advanced heavy-water thorium cycle.This first employs the PHWRs fuelled by natural uranium, and light water reactors, to produce plutonium.

Stage 2 uses fast neutron reactors burning the plutonium to breed U-233 from thorium. The blanket around the core will have uranium as well as thorium, so that further plutonium (ideally high-fissile Pu) is produced as well as the U-233.

Then in stage 3, Advanced Heavy Water Reactors (AHWRs) burn the U-233 and this plutonium with thorium, getting about two thirds of their power from the thorium.

In 2002 the regulatory authority issued approval to start construction of a 500 MW prototype fast breeder reactor at Kalpakkam and this is now under construction by BHAVINI. The unit is expected to be operating in 2010, fuelled with uranium-plutonium oxide (the reactor-grade Pu being from its existing PHWRs). It will have a blanket with thorium and uranium to breed fissile U-233 and plutonium respectively. This will take India's ambitious thorium program to stage 2, and set the scene for eventual full utilisation of the country's abundant thorium to fuel reactors. Four more such fast reactors have been announced for construction by 2020.

Initial FBRs will be have mixed oxide fuel but these will be followed by metallic-fuelled ones to enable shorter doubling time.

Radioactive Waste Management

Radioactive wastes from the nuclear reactors and reprocessing plants are treated and stored at each site. Waste immobilisation plants are in operation at Tarapur and Trombay and another is being constructed at Kalpakkam. Research on final disposal of high-level and long-lived wastes in a geological repository is in progress at BARC.

Regulation and safety

The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was established in 1948 under the Atomic Energy Act as a policy body. Then in 1954 the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was set up to encompass research, technology development and commercial reactor operation. The current Atomic Energy Act is 1962, and it permits only government-owned enterprises to be involved in nuclear power.

The DAE includes NPCIL, Uranium Corporation of India (mining and processing), Electronics Corporation of India Ltd (reactor control and instrumentation) and BHAVIN* (for setting up fast reactors). The government also controls the Heavy Water Board for production of heavy water and the Nuclear Fuel Complex for fuel and component manufacture.

* Bhartiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Ltd

The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) was formed in 1983 and comes under the AEC but is independent of DAE. It is responsible for the regulation and licensing of all nuclear facilities, and their safety and carries authority conferred by the Atomic Energy Act for radiation safety and by the Factories Act for industrial safety in nuclear plants.

NPCIL is an active participant in the programmes of the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO).

Research & Development

An early AEC decision was to set up the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) at Trombay near Mumbai. A series of 'research' reactors and critical facilities was built here: APSARA (1 MW, 1956) was the first research reactor in Asia, Cirus (40 MW, 1960) and Dhruva (100 MW, 1985) followed it along with fuel cycle facilities. The Cirus and Dhruva units are assumed to be for military purposes, as is the plutonium plant commissioned in 1965.

BARC is also responsible for the transition to thorium-based systems and in particular is developing the 300 MWe AHWR as a technology demonstration project. This will be a vertical pressure tube design with heavy water moderator, boiling light water cooling with passive safety design and thorium-plutonium based fuel.

A series of three Purnima research reactors have explored the thorium cycle, the first (1971) running on plutonium fuel fabricated at BARC, the second and third (1984 & 1990) on U-233 fuel made from thorium - U-233 having been first separated in 1970.

Two civil research reactors at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research at Kalpakkam are preparing for stage two of the thorium cycle. The 40 MWt fast breeder test reactor (FBTR) has been operating since 1985, and has achieved 120,000 MWday/tonne burnup with its carbide fuel (70% PuC + 30% UC). In 2005 the FBTR fuel cycle was closed, with the reprocessing of 100 GWd/t fuel - claimed as a world first. FBTR is based on the French Rapsodie FBR design. Also the tiny Kamini (Kalpakkam mini) reactor is exploring the use of thorium as nuclear fuel, by breeding fissile U-233. BHAVINI is located here and draws upon the centre's expertise and that of NPCIL in establishing the fast reactor program.

As part of developing higher-burnup fuel for PHWRs mixed oxide (MOX) fuel is being used experimentally in them.

In 1998 a 500 keV accelerator was commissioned at BARC for research on accelerator-driven subcritical systems as an option for stage three of the thorium cycle.

The Board of Radiation & Isotope Technology was separated from BARC in 1989 and is responsible for radioisotope production. The research reactors APSARA, CIRUS and Dhruva are used, along with RAPS for cobalt-60.

Non-proliferation

India's nuclear industry is largely without IAEA safeguards, though four nuclear power plants (see above) are under facility-specific arrangements related to IndiaÕs INFCIRC/66 safeguards agreement with IAEA. The lack of full-scope IAEA safeguards however means that India is isolated from world trade by the Nuclear Suppliers' Group.

However, India has been scrupulous in ensuring that its weapons material and technology are guarded against commercial or illicit export to other countries.

Following the 2005 agreement between US and Indian heads of state on nuclear energy cooperation, the UK indicated its strong support for greater cooperation and France then Canada then moved in the same direction. The US Department of Commerce, the UK and Canada have relaxed controls on export of technology to India, though staying within the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines. The French government says it will seek a nuclear cooperation agreement, and Canada has agreed to "pursue further opportunities for the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy" with India.

In December 2006 the US Congress passed legislation to enable trade with India of nuclear fuel and technology, after reconciling earlier House and Senate versions of it. The final wording is under consideration by India's parliament, which will need to put most of the country's nuclear power reactors under IAEA safeguards. A safeguards agreement with the IAEA must now be negotiated, and agreement of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group will be required before a bilateral trade agreement in line with the new Act can be sent to Congress. The ultimate objective is to put India on the same footing as China in respect to responsibilities and trade opportunities.

BACKGROUND TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ISSUES

India (along with Pakistan and Israel) was originally a 'threshold' country in terms of the international non-proliferation regime, possessing, or quickly capable of assembling one or more nuclear weapons: Their nuclear weapons capability at the technological level was recognised (all have research reactors at least) along with their military ambitions, and all remained outside the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which 186 nations have now signed. This led to their being largely excluded from trade in nuclear plant or materials, except for safety-related devices for a few safeguarded facilities.

India is opposed to the NPT as it now stands, and has consistently attacked the Treaty since its inception in 1970.

Regional rivalry

Relations between India and Pakistan are tense and hostile, and the risks of nuclear conflict between them have long been considered quite high.

In 1974 India exploded a "peaceful" nuclear device and then in May 1998 India and Pakistan each exploded several nuclear devices underground. This heightened concerns regarding an arms race between them.

Kashmir is a prime cause of bilateral tension, its sovereignty has been in dispute since 1948. There is persistent low level military conflict due to Pakistan backing a Muslim rebellion there.

Both countries engaged in a conventional arms race in the 1980s, including sophisticated technology and equipment capable of delivering nuclear weapons. In the 1990s the arms race quickened. In 1994 India reversed a four-year trend of reduced allocations for defence, and despite its much smaller economy, Pakistan pushed its own expenditures yet higher. Both have lost their patrons: India, the former USSR; and Pakistan, the USA.

In 1997 India deployed a medium-range missile and is now developing a long-range missile capable of reaching targets in China's industrial heartland.

In 1995 the USA quietly intervened to head off a proposed nuclear test. The 1998 tests were unambiguously military, including one claimed to be of a sophisticated thermonuclear device. Their declared purpose was "to help in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields and different delivery systems".

It is the growth and modernisation of China's nuclear arsenal and its assistance with Pakistan's nuclear power program and, reportedly, with missile technology, which now exacerbates Indian concerns. In particular, China's People's Liberation Army operates somewhat autonomously within Pakistan as an exporter of military material.

Indian security policies are driven by:

• its desire to be recognised as the dominant power in the region;
• its increasing concern with China's expanding nuclear weapons and missile delivery programs; and
• its deep concern about Pakistan, with its nuclear weapons capability and now the clear capability to deliver such weapons deep into India.

It perceives nuclear weapons as a cost-effective political counter to China's nuclear and conventional weaponry, and the effects of its nuclear weapons policy in provoking Pakistan is, by some accounts, considered incidental.

India has had an unhappy relationship with China. Soundly defeated by China in the 1962 war, relations were frozen until 1998. Since then a degree of high-level contact has been established and a few elementary confidence-building measures put in place. China still occupies some Indian territory. Its nuclear and missile support for Pakistan is however a major bone of contention.

India's weapons material appears to come from the Canadian-designed 40 MWt Cirus "research" reactor which started up in 1960 (well before the NPT), and the 100 MWt Dhruva indigenous unit in operation since 1985, using local uranium. It is estimated that India may have built up enough weapons-grade plutonium for one hundred nuclear warheads.

Nuclear arms control in the region

The public stance of India and Pakistan on non-proliferation differs markedly.

Pakistan has initiated a series of regional security proposals. It has repeatedly proposed a nuclear-free zone in South Asia and has proclaimed its willingness to engage in nuclear disarmament and to sign the NPT if India would do so. This would involve disarming and joining as non-weapon states. It has endorsed a US proposal for a regional five power conference to consider non-proliferation in South Asia.

India has taken the view that solutions to regional security issues should be found at the international rather than the regional level, since its chief concern is with China. It therefore rejects Pakistan's proposals.

Instead, the 'Gandhi Plan', put forward in 1988, proposed the revision of the NPT, which it regards correctly as inherently discriminatory in favour of the nuclear-weapon States, and a timetable for complete nuclear weapons disarmament. It endorsed early proposals for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and for an international convention to ban the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes, known as the 'cut-off' convention.

The USA has, for some years pursued a variety of initiatives to persuade India and Pakistan to abandon their nuclear weapons programs and to accept comprehensive international safeguards on all their nuclear activities. To this end the Clinton administration proposed a conference of nine states, comprising the five established nuclear-weapon states, along with Japan, Germany, India and Pakistan.

This and previous similar proposals have been rejected by India, which countered with demands that other potential weapons states, such as Iran and North Korea, should be invited, and that regional limitations would only be acceptable if they were accepted equally by China. The USA would not accept the participation of Iran and North Korea and such initiatives lapsed.

Another, more recent approach, centres on the concept of containment, designed to 'cap' the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, which would hopefully be followed by 'roll back'. To this end India and the USA jointly sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution in 1993 calling for negotiations for a 'cut-off' convention, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Should India and Pakistan join such a convention, they would have to agree to halt the production of fissile materials for weapons and to accept international verification on their relevant nuclear facilities (enrichment and reprocessing). In short, their weapons programs would be thus 'capped'. It appeared that India was prepared to join negotiations regarding such a FMCT under the 1995 UN Conference on Disarmament (UNCD).

However, despite the widespread international support for a FMCT, formal negotiations on cut-off have not yet begun. The UNCD can only approve decisions by consensus and since the summer of 1995, the insistence of a few states to link FMCT negotiations to other nuclear disarmament issues has brought progress on the cut-off treaty there to a standstill.

Bilateral confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan to reduce the prospects of confrontation have been limited. In 1990 each side ratified a treaty not to attack the other's nuclear installations, and at the end of 1991 they provided one another with a list showing the location of all their nuclear plants, even though the respective lists were regarded as not being wholly accurate. Early in 1994 India proposed a bilateral agreement for a 'no first use' of nuclear weapons and an extension of the 'no attack' treaty to cover civilian and industrial targets as well as nuclear installations.

Having promoted the CTBT since 1954, India dropped its support in 1995 and in 1996 attempted to block the Treaty. Following the 1998 tests the question has been reopened and both Pakistan and India have indicated their intention to sign the CTBT. Indian ratification may be conditional upon the five weapons states agreeing to specific reductions in nuclear arsenals.